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Network Access Control (NAC) systems manage the access of new
devices into enterprise networks to prevent unauthorised devices
from aacking network services. e main diculty with this ap-
proach is that NAC cannot detect abnormal behaviour of devices
connected to an enterprise network. ese abnormal devices can
be detected using outlier detection techniques. Existing outlier
detection techniques focus on specic application domains such as
fraud, event or system health monitoring. In this paper, we review
aacks on Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) enterprise networks as
well as existing clustering-based outlier detection algorithms along
with their limitations. Importantly, existing techniques can detect
outliers, but cannot detect where or which device is causing the
abnormal behaviour. We develop a novel behaviour-based outlier
detection technique which detects abnormal behaviour according
to a device type prole. Based on data analysis with K-means
clustering, we build device type proles using Clustering-based
Multivariate Gaussian Outlier Score (CMGOS) and lter out abnor-
mal devices from the device type prole. e experimental results
show the applicability of our approach as we can obtain a device
type prole for ve dell-netbooks, three iPads, two iPhone 3G, two
iPhones 4G and Nokia Phones and detect outlying devices within
the device type prole.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile device security has become a necessity in our daily life
due to the proliferation of the Internet of ings (IoT). e mass
usage of mobile devices in workplaces has given rise to security
threats such as malware, spyware, and distributed denial of service
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aacks [8]. e evolution of BYOD has tremendously increased
security concerns, particularly in Network Access Control (NAC)
systems despite using pre-shared key (PSK) mode, but there are
still security vulnerabilities. Enterprise networks are susceptible to
security aacks when employee devices are lost or stolen. Anyone
in possession of the lost or stolen device with malicious intent could
use the saved passwords and gain access to the enterprise network
illegally. NAC systems were developed to addresses these concerns.
e NAC system unies endpoint security solutions to enable and
enforce access control security policies to devices connecting to
an enterprise network through a RADIUS authentication server;
which is a prerequisite for 802.1x authentication [11]. e Radius
server enables the creation of unique usernames and passwords
and could help network administrators to revoke access to lost or
stolen employee devices. Another concern arises from devices with
outdated security patches. For example, an aacker can exploit a
vulnerability to capture device login credentials using fake RADIUS
requests [19]. RADIUS impersonation is another security vulnera-
bility that uses an NPS vulnerability to gain unauthorised access or
redirect authorised users to a rogue access point to gain their login
credentials [4]. e device type behaviour proling addresses NAC
limitations by allowing the administrators to create a device type
prole for each device type and detect abnormal devices from the
device types proles.
e organisation of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses
the limitations of BYOD security-enabling technologies. e review
of outlier detection algorithms based on clustering techniques along
with their limitations is presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyses
the dataset used in developing our behaviour-based outlier detec-
tion technique. Device type proling and detection of an abnormal
device from the device type prole were introduced and analysed
in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE ENTERPRISE
NETWORK
BYOD is a new trend that allows employees to use their own
smartphones, tablets and laptops to access enterprise resources
for work [22]. Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) suites and
Network Access Control (NAC) systems are the enabling technolo-
gies used in BYOD to manage, monitor, control the data on mobile
devices and to enforce access control security policies to devices
connecting to the BYOD enterprise network [18]. BYOD uses tra-
ditional security measures such as antivirus, anti-malware and
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IDS/IPS systems to protect the enterprise network. However, these
security measures are not sucient to counter security concerns
that arise from abnormal behaviour of the devices connected to
the network [17]. Li et al. [14] proposed a behaviour proling
approach on mobile devices to detect abnormal paerns or devi-
ations from normal usage. ey built a user prole by taking the
paern of device usage, text messages, application and Bluetooth
scanning. e prole was built to detect abnormal usage by spec-
ifying a normal usage prole and considering other uses outside
the prole abnormal. However, this framework focuses only on the
user and not on their devices. Muhammad et al. [17] proposed a
device type proling approach that detects the variations of packet
inter-arrival times from smartphones, tablets and laptops and lters
the device causing the abnormal paern, their approach is limited
to k-means clustering approach. However, this work identied
some limitations in using clustering in building a device or device
proling.
e abnormal behaviour detection technique by Kang et al. [11]
uses contextual data of users having access to an enterprise network.
e technique models a device’s contextual data, such as the type of
device used, access time, access location and time of use and builds
a usage paern for detection of abnormal behaviours inside an
enterprise network. Kim and Kim [12] propose a behaviour-based
anomaly detection technique that detects abnormal behaviours
in services used in a BYOD environment. ey build behaviour
paerns for network usage using contextual data such as device
type, access time, access location and use time. e approaches in
[21, 23] focus on device ngerprinting to identify devices.
However, none of the above techniques considers detecting ab-
normal paerns from network devices or device types. In contrast,
our behaviour-based outlier detection technique adopts unsuper-
vised outlier detection to build a device type prole. e device
type proles can be used in detecting abnormal device(s) that can
cause harm to the network. e unsupervised outlier detection
approaches consist of one class Support Vector Machine (SVM),
Nearest Neighbor (NN) and clustering techniques. e clustering-
based technique was adopted due to limitations of SVM and NN
that the former needs labels assigned to data instances and the
laer is computationally extensive and can fail to label the data
correctly. e advantages of clustering techniques are their speed,
their ability to handle complex problems and their ability to use
unlabelled data instances.
3 OUTLIER DETECTION
Outliers are extreme paerns of observation that signicantly de-
viate from the majority of a data sample [3]. Outlier detection
problems can be solved using local or global approaches [1, 9]. e
research approaches in [5–7, 9, 10] developed outlier detection al-
gorithms that detect outliers from data. ese clustering-based
algorithms include Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF),
Local Density Based Outlier Factor (LDCOF) and Clustering-based
Multivariate Gaussian Outlier Score (CMGOS). Each algorithm uses
clustered data as input, calculates an outlier score and visualises
the results. We used their implementations in RapidMiner Studio
[16].
3.1 Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF)
CBLOF adopts global outlier detection approach, in which each
instance of a data is assigned an outlier score. He et al. [10] develop
CBLOF technique to detect outliers using the squeezer algorithm.
e squeezer algorithm calculates the outlier score and partitions
the data into large and small clusters using two parameters α and
β , where α species the percentage of the dataset assumed to be
outlier-free and β species the boundaries between large and small
clusters. e outlier score is assigned to instances nearest to large
clusters multiplied by the cluster size. is technique uses cluster
density as a scaling factor, which can result in incorrect density
estimation. erefore, Goldstein et al. [9] proposed unweighted-
CBLOF (uCBLOF) which disables cluster estimation using local
density. uCBLOF signicantly improves the outlier detection.
3.2 Local Density Cluster-Based Outlier Factor
(LDCOF)
LDCOF [1] follows a similar approach to CBLOF. It adopts a local
outlier detection approach using the direct neighbourhood of a data
instance to calculate the outlier score. is local outlier detection
approach detects outliers that are ignored by global approaches,
especially in cases where local densities within datasets are varied.
LDCOF addresses CBLOF weaknesses by estimating the local den-
sity of data instances based on the average distance of all cluster
members to the nearest cluster centroid and by assuming a spher-
ical distribution of the cluster members. In contrast to CBLOF, γ
replaces α and β to calculate the outlier score, where an outlier
score of greater than or equal to 1.0 indicates abnormal instances.
One of the limitations of this approach is that outliers far from the
centroid point tend to increase the average distance and when the
average distance is high, the outliers cannot be detected because
they appear as normal.
3.3 Clustering-based Multivariate Gaussian
Outlier Score (CMGOS)
In contrast to CBLOF and LDCOF, CMGOS uses two separate algo-
rithms: a clustering algorithm and a density estimation algorithm
using a subspace of each cluster. e clustering algorithm is per-
formed using existing clustering techniques, for example, k-means,
x-means, or DBSCAN. Density estimation is performed using a
multivariate Gaussian model that can use distance measures such
as Mahalanobis, Euclidean distance, or Square loss [20] to com-
pute the outlier score. is algorithm takes cluster output as input,
calculates the outlier score based on the multivariate Gaussian of
the cluster centroid and computes the covariance matrix of each
cluster centroid. Since a covariance matrix is sensitive to outliers,
the algorithm is congured to remove outliers according to ex-
pected percentage and recompute the matrix using estimations
such as reduction, regularisation and minimum covariance deter-
minant (MCD). e reduction is similar to a multivariate Grubb’s
test, regularisation is similar to classication, and MCD is the idea
of estimating a compact covariance matrix by brute-force search
for normal records. e outlier score is computed by dividing the
divergence of an instance to its nearest centroid using a distribu-
tion ing with a certain condence interval as a normalisation
process such that an outlier score ≤ 1.0 indicates a high probability
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Research Algorithm Technique Data Points
He et al. [10] Squeezer CBLOF All Data
Duan et al. [6] LDBSCAN LOF All data
Amer et al. [1] One-class SVM CBLOF All Data
Goldstein et al. [9] K-means CBLOF, uCBLOF, LDCOF, CMGOS All Data
Behavior-Based Outlier Detection (BBOD) K-means CMGOS, IFT Device Type
Table 1: Related work comparisons
of normal instance. e implementation of CMGOS algorithm can
be found in RapidMiner Studio [16] and the following steps can be
used to congure CMGOS algorithm.
(1) Cluster the data using clustering technique e.g. K-Means
(2) Input the resulting cluster results into CMGOS operator
(3) Assign thresholds to the parameters p and γ
(4) Select Reduction, Regularisation or Minimum Covariance
Determinant (MCD) in the operator menu
(5) Specify the number of samples for MCD (If MCD is chosen)
according to the probability of normal class
(6) Iterate and compute the distance measure (e.g Euclidean)
for all instances of the data to the cluster centroids
(7) Calculate the outlier score of all instances and visualise the
result
In contrast to these existing cluster-based outlier detection tech-
niques, which detect outliers based on all data points, our Behaviour-
Based Outlier Detection (BBOD) technique detects outliers accord-
ing to the device type (see Table 1). e device type prole is built
to identify the normal and abnormal instances from each device
based on the outlier score. e prole for each device in the device
type prole is considered normal if the outlier score of the data
instances is ≤ 1.0 and vice versa for the abnormal proles.
4 BEHAVIOUR-BASED OUTLIER DETECTION
(BBOD)
Behaviour-based outlier detection consists of two stages (behaviour
proling and Intelligent Filtering Technique (IFT)). ese two stages
were developed using publicly available test-bed data collected from
mobile devices [24]. e dataset was used in [13, 21] for active and
passive ngerprinting of wireless devices and their types from
wired-side observation. It is publicly available in [23] and contains
packet Inter-Arrival Times (IATs) of twenty-seven mobile devices
including smartphones, tablets and laptops, the analysis of this data
can be found in [17]. e packet IAT measures the time between
two consecutive packets received and is unique for each device
type [2]. For example, the IAT of iPhone 3G is unique and dierent
to the IATs of iPhone 4G. erefore, the IAT could help in learning
the dierences between the same device types connected to the
same enterprise network.
For this work, we focus on isolated test-bed data because it was
collected in an isolated environment without interference. e
data contains 94 les containing IAT records of 14 mobile devices
including ve Dell-Netbooks, three iPads, two iPhone 3G, two
iPhone 4G and two Nokia Phones. To analyse and develop a device
type prole using this data, we focus on the iPerf TCP Case 2 traces
though the same procedure may be applied to the remaining data
traces.
A descriptive analysis of the data was conducted using K-means
clustering. We used the K-means implementation in Rapidminer
Studio [16] with the following seings (See Figure 1): k = 2 deter-
mined using DB-index. e DB-index produces clusters with low
or high results aached to the number of k ; the smallest DB-index
is considered the best criterion for specifying the optimal number
of k [15]. We set the maximum runs to 10 to produce random
initial centroids for each run and the robustness of k-means data
assignments depends on its reproducibility. We used the squared
euclidean distance because it is faster than other distance measures
and set the maximum optimisation to 100 as the maximum number
of iterations for each run.
Figure 1: Conguration of K-means Operator
Table 2 presents the clustering results. As can be seen from
the results the IATs of Dell Netbooks (DN1-5) in centroid 1 equals
to 0.001ms in all the devices while the devices in centroid 2 fall
within the range 0.001 - 0.003ms except DN5 which has 0.440ms,
this shows that there are some irregularities in DN5. We observed
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iPhone 3G IT1 0.002 0.002IT2 0.003 0.122
iPhone 4G IF1 0.001 0.001IF2 0.001 0.134
Nokia Phones NP1 0.001 0.001NP2 0.001 2.354
Table 2: Cluster Analysis for iPerf-Tcp-Case 2 data based on
packet inter-arrival-times
that cluster 2 of DN5 consisted of only four IATs in the range of
0.463 - 0.514ms. As can be seen in Table 2, we observed similar
paerns for the other device types.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the Centroid 1 in all
the devices ranges between 0.001 and 0.003ms, while the Centroid
2 shows some discrepancies. Also, it can be clearly understood
that there may be potential outliers in most of the devices that the
k-means clustering algorithm was not able to detect. erefore,
we use k-means clustering only to help congure the boundaries
(Centroid 1 and 2) for detection of normal and abnormal paerns.
As stated in Section 3.3, the output of the k-means clustering is used
as an input for the Clustering-based Multivariate Gaussian Outlier
Score (CMGOS) in the implementation of a device type proling
approach.
5 DEVICE TYPE PROFILING
Behaviour proling is a technique used for the detection of un-
usual paerns or deviations from normal behaviour. e proposed
Device Type Proling in algorithm 1 was used in implementing
behaviour-based outlier detection. e following steps were fol-
lowed to congure the algorithm. In step (1 and 2) the data was
concatenated into one data le and partitioned into two (See section
4) to obtain boundaries for the normal and abnormal paerns. In
step (3) the boundaries from the cluster output are used as input for
CMGOS operator. Step (4,5,6) sets parameters for normal and ab-
normal proles. Step (7) calculates the outlier score for each device
type and (8) lters the outlier scores ≥ 1 (the value is constant [9]).
en step (9) generates a labelled data with two classes (normal
and abnormal) and visualise the results proles and the nal step
(10) applies intelligent ltering technique to detect and block the
abnormal device.
5.1 Experiments Settings
e experiment was carried out in RapidMiner Studio [16] using
the sequence of operators shown in Fig. 2. e algorithm was
congured to load and process data according to device type. e
data operator loads individual data les from each device and device
type, K-means operator calculates and set the boundaries using the
seings described in section 4. In conguring CMGOS operator
dierent seings has been experimented, below seing produce
the best results, the probability of normal = 0.99, gamma (γ ) = 0.1,
covariance estimation =Reduction, Time to remove outlier = 1 (i.e.
the number of times minimum covariance matrix remove outliers)
and the measure type = mixed measure using mixed Euclidean
distance. e local density estimation of each cluster boundary
is estimated using a multivariate Gaussian model, whereas the
Euclidean distance serves as a basis for computing the outlier score
for each data instance in the cluster boundary. en computes the
covariance matrix for each cluster boundary using two iterations
to remove outliers and compute the covariance matrix again. en
calculates the outlier score by dividing the Euclidean distance of a
data instance nearest to each cluster boundary to normalise the data
with a certain condence interval. e chi-squared distribution is
used in normalisation such that the outlier score <= 1.0 indicates a
high probability of the data instance fall into the normal prole.
Figure 2: Device type Proling Process
Algorithm 1 Device Type Proling algorithm
(1) Concatenate the Data from all devices into one le (Device
Type)
(2) Cluster the IAT data using K-Means with k = 2.
(3) Input the resulting cluster results into CMGOS operator,
assign threshold into the parameter p and assign threshold
to γ
(4) Select Reduction in the operator menu
(5) Specify the values for times to remove outlier
(6) Iterate and compute the Squared Euclidean Distance for
all instances of IAT to the cluster centroids
(7) Calculate and display the outlier score of all instances
(8) Apply and use lter in the Outlier Score to compute the
score ≤ 1.0 for normal instances and > 1 to abnormal
instances
(9) Extract normal and abnormal proles and visualise the
result
(10) Apply Intelligent Filtering Technique (IFT) to the proles
and block the abnormal device
5.2 Analysis of Device Type Proling
e result presented in Table 3 shows implementation of device
type proling Steps 1-8 of Algorithm 1 for Dell Netbooks, iPads,
iPhone 3G and Nokia though more devices can be added later. From
the Dell-Netbooks results, it can be seen that the total IAT points
equal to 9, 100, 324 out of which the normal prole contains 99.3%
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and the abnormal prole with 0.7%. In the iPads, the total number
of IAT points is 4, 581, 539 where the normal prole has 99.8% and
abnormal with 0.2% of the IAT points. In the device type proles of
iPhone 3G, there was a total of 1, 129, 399 IAT points out of which
the normal proles are estimated at 98.6% and abnormal at 1.4%.
Also, in iPhone 4G the total number of IAT points is 8, 300, 764 in
which the normal prole has 99.5% of the IAT points and abnormal
with 0.5%. In the case of Nokia Phones, the total number of IAT
points is 1, 563, 011 where the normal prole contains 99.7% of
the points and abnormal 0.3%. Based on the above analysis, it
can be seen that the normal proles in all cases have the largest
number of IAT points and the abnormal have much smaller numbers.
us, the boundaries used from the clustering only help in building
device type proles but do not determine which device has a higher
number of abnormal paerns.





Dell-Netbooks 9,034,201 66,123 0.7
iPads 4,570,163 11,376 0.2
iPhone 3G 1,113,549 15,850 1.4
iPhone 4G 8,260,063 40,701 0.5
Nokia Phones 1,558,888 4,123 0.3
Table 3: Device Type Proling using Clustering-based Mul-
tivariate Gaussian Outlier Score
e results in Table 4 helps in identifying the device having
a large number of outliers within the device type prole. is
was investigated to identify the device inuencing the abnormal
paerns from each device type proles presented in Table 3. As
can be seen from Table 4, DN4 contains 66% of the outlying points
spreading around while other devices are falling into the range
between 4-7% respectively. It can be seen that DN4 is the outlying
device and the other devices having a smaller percentage of outliers
that may be due to measurement errors which will be investigated
further in the future enhancement of this technique. We observed
similar paern in the other device type where IP2, IT1, IF1 and NP1
were identied as the abnormal devices that are blocked by IFT. To
the best of our knowledge this is the rst technique that applies a
ngerprinting and proling technique to identify abnormal device
from the proles and intelligent ltering technique to block the
abnormal device identied in the prole.
e related works in [2, 21, 24] developed a ngerprinting tech-
nique that identies a device and device type using device sig-
natures. e ngerprinting technique is part of reconnaissance
(i.e. gathering information about an aacker) but does not de-
tect abnormal behaviour or aacks in a network. Whereas, the
research approaches in [11, 12, 14, 17] developed a behaviour pro-
ling techniques that builds a behaviour proles from device usage,
network characteristics and contextual network data to detect a
paern(s) that deviates from the normal prole and alert a network
administrator. e novelty of BBOD is that it combines both the
ngerprinting and behaviour proling approaches to identify, de-
tect and block the abnormal device identied in a network. e
BBOD is developed using Clustering-based Multivariate Gaussian
Outlier Score to dene a normal and abnormal prole and applies
intelligent ltering technique to identify and block the device(s)
causing the abnormal paern in the network which improves the
research works in [1, 10, 16] that focus on detecting outliers from
the whole network.











iPhone 3G IT1 10,157 64IT2 5,693 36
iPhone 4G IF1 24,282 60IF2 16,419 40
Nokia Phones NP1 2,830 69NP2 1,293 31
Table 4: Distribution of abnormal points in Table 3 over in-
dividual devices
6 CONCLUSION
We present a novel behaviour-based outlier detection technique
that builds a device-type prole, detects and lters out abnormal
devices from the device type prole. We compared the technique
with related outlier detection techniques and discussed their limita-
tions along with improvements. e literature review discusses the
limitations of BYOD security-enabling technologies and gives an
insight into how the traditional security measures are used in NAC
systems to monitor and block malicious devices in the BYOD plat-
forms. Also, monitor the devices that do not comply with enterprise
security policy. As stated in the literature review, the existing BYOD
security-enabling technologies do not detect the device causing an
abnormal paern within the BYOD enterprise network. One of the
limitations of these techniques is that they either block the devices
that do not comply with enterprise policy or produce false alarms.
is work improved the current techniques by developing a device
type prole to detect abnormal device from the device type prole.
e technique is an improvement of work in [17, 18] which adopts
k-means clustering and CMGOS outlier detection technique to de-
tect and lter out abnormal device(s) from device type proles. e
experimental results show the applicability of this behaviour-based
outlier detection approach as we are able to identify and analyse
the device(s) raising the inter-arrival time trac in the network.
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